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THE STUDY OF AFRICAN LAW AT THE AFRICAN STUDIES CENTRE, LEIDEN;
IN REACTION TO JOHN GRIFFITHS' OVERVIEW OF
« V l /THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF IAW INTHE NETHERLANDS IN THE 1970's'
Wim M.J. van Binsbergen
Professor John Griffiths (an American occupying the chair of sociology of
law at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands) has pubiished, in a
recent issue of NRR ('Newsletter for Dutch-language sociologists of law,
anthropologist of law and psychologists of law1) a critical overview of
the anthropology of law in the Netherlands in the 1970s. This review
exceeds 100 pages, and includes what Griffiths (1983: 224) claims to be 'a
complete bibliography of Dutch legal anthropology in that period'.
The production of such overviews has become rather fashionable in
Dutch anthropology in recent years (cf. Kloos & Claessen 1975, 1981); and
Dutch sociologists are now involved in a similar exercise, by means of a
conference convened for spring, 1984. In the current climate of financial
cutbacks and govermnent-imposed restructuring of the organization of
research, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, it is only understandable that
one tries to create and exploit new intellectual and institutional boun-
daries, mobilizing potential friends and stressing if not inventing
cleavages and feuds, for the sake of compétition over funds, personnel
establishment, institutional récognition, and academie esteem.
Griffiths joined a Dutch law faculty in 1977 from abroad, and during
the period covered by his review his personal contribution to legal
anthropology and related fields has been on the level of legal theory and
the philosophy of law, rather than empirical socio-légal studies (see his
bibliography, Griffiths 1983: 229). Griffiths thus has the advantage of
being an impartial outside observer, from a national and to some extent
also from a disciplinary point of view, No doubt work on the review was
for him a highly rewarding familiarization tour across the Dutch intellec-
tual landscape and its history. The fact that he writes in English presu-
mably makes his extensive summaries of publications and of colleagues's
biographies rather useful to other outsiders.
NNR
1984, jaarg. 5, no. 2, 199-207
1 34,
200 Wim M.J. van Binsbergen
At the same time, his outsidership may have been an impediment. One
vonders whether the task of reviewing and, with the powers of hindsight,
structuring and restructuring the national outlines of what hè claims to
be a subdiscipline, should not have been left to someone more solidly
f
rooted in that field over a longer period of time, someone who could match
his bibliographical, synthetic and theoretical skills (such as Griffiths
obviously possesses) with personal expériences of the period described.
Admittedly Griffiths's picture of Dutch legal anthropology in the
1970s is on the whole extremely gratifying: the 1970s are claimed to have
witnessed the rather unexpected rebirth of the subdiscipline, in the
Netherlands, from the ashes of a honourable but unfortunately declined
tradition featuring such great names as Ter Haar and Van Vollenhove.
However, not so rauch the data but the author's treatment falls short of
being totally convincing. The same few names and projects come back time
and again in this excessively long and répétitive overview. Far too much
attention is paid to insignificant, even unpublished, articles and lec-
tures. Far too few colleagues are praised far too highly. Far too little
is shown of a historical sense (as is best demonstrated by the very
unfair, for anachronistic, treatment of André Köbben's séminal work -
Griffiths 1983: 164-65). The author has hardly any understanding let alone
appréciation of the institutional, intellectual and social preconceptions
that underlie academie life in the Netherlands. Increasingly, one has the
feeling of reading not a scholarly study but a political or even religious
pamphlet, whose aim is not so much describing and analysing a recent past
but evoking the illusion of an imminent golden age.
If this is what the editors and subscribers of NRR like to print
respectively read, let them go ahead. In reality, of course, legal anthro-
pology in the Netherlands scarcely exists as a distinct subdiscipline. It
is amorphous, floating, historically heterogeneous, largely determined by
conventions of Dutch academie subculture which Griffiths shows no signs of
having internalized, and by and large it is so parochial that personal
network contacts and personal rivalries détermine it more than anything
else. Griffiths covers himself nicely by claiming that his review is
'still a more or less provisional version' (1983: 132), and invites
critical remarks. Now that his version has already been published, Grif-
fiths regrettably has forced the hands of those wishing to comment on the
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more controversial parts of hls paper: they have no option but engaging in
published debate, thus risking to overstate points which would perhaps be
better discussed in a more informal and relaxed way. Incidentally, the
same would apply to some of Griffiths's own remarks, e.g. those concerning
the 'scandaleus' ('in the technical sense of the word'; Griffiths 1983:
213) ignorance of Dutch anthropologists, who according to him fail to
recognize legal anthropology as the cornerstone of their discipline; or
1 the alleged absurdity of national procedures of research funds allocation.
Such général attacks on Dutch conditions as Griffiths's review contain,
are not not my concern hère. However, he also levels a very spécifie and
violent attack on research and research policy at the African Studies
Centre, Leiden; and as head of one of this institutions two research
departments, it is my duty to reply to his challenge.
Griffiths's picture (1983: 156, 160-63, 168-70, 185-91, 221) of work
at the African Studies Centre during the 1970s, and subséquent develop-
ments in thé 1980s there, can be summarized as follows. As an aftermath
of Holleman's leadership (whose formal link with thé African Studies
Centre was severed in 1969), thé Centre is claimed to have been prominent
s
I in thé study of African law right through thé 1970s, successfully embar-
!l king on ail sorts of activities (research, conferences, publications) in
f which over the years more than ten different researchers are said to hâve
l been involved. While going into excessive détail in some cases, Griffiths
"?.
è underexposes thé work of some other African Studies Centre researchers in
| thé 1970s. Thus on the basis of his review the uninformed reader would
I scarcely suspect that it was Harrell-Bond and Rijnsdorp who, during much
- of thé period covered, carried thé lion's share of légal research at our
l-
§ institution. Their Sierra Leone project was rather more successful than
! Griffiths suggests; its output includes for instance one major book
I overlooked by Griffiths (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978). Anyway, in 1983, one
f of thé African Studies Centre researchers, E. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal,
* saw his activities in the field of légal anthropology rewarded by a
part-time chair in African constitutional law at Leiden University. But
one swallow does not make summer. For Griffiths signais at the same time
'a well-advanced proposai to eliminate thé Law section and "inte-
grate" it in a Department of Political Development and History,
headed by a (sic) anthropologist. When one considers thé lack of
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interest in or knowledge of legal anthropology (or matters legal in
général) which have been long typical of Dutch social science — a
generalization to which the current leaderschip (58) of the African
Studies Center is no exception — it seems safe to translate "inte-
grate" out of bureaucratie jargon into "eïiminate" in plain language.
Certainly there is no reason to suppose that anthropoïoff̂ of léwVill
fare better in the surrounding of such a Department; ̂than%!i|ÉV°es in -
any other social science"'departrient in the cotmt-ry.f .̂..;, what a |
shame such a (graduai) death will be' (Griffiths 1983: 160).
Earlier it was scandal, and now shame; again, presumably, in the
technical sense of the word? Fortunately, the truth is both more complex
and more balanced; and in view of the excessive length and repetitiveness
of Griffiths's overview, one can hardly suspect that sheer limitations of
space made him hold back essentiel information which however was at his
disposai.
In 1980 (cf. Grootenhuis 1983; van Binsbergen 1981) the African
Studies Centre decided to reorganize lts research activities. The struc-
ture of about ten small sections - one among them the African law section
- was supplanted by two major interdisciplinary research departments, one
concentrating on rural development, the other on state and society in both
a historical and a contemporary perspective. Research activities came to
be structured, no longer by academie discipline, but around these two
broad thèmes. As a transitional measure, only too common in cases of
institutional reorganization, this shift was not immediately implemented
to the füll extent, and the small law section was allowed to persist for
some time as a monodisciplinary anomaly; this anomaly has recently been
terminated by the Board, thus making definitive what Griffiths still
refers to as a proposai (the dissolution of the law section). The program-
mes of both departments had, from their first formulation in 1980-81, been
sufficiently broad so as to encompass the study of relevant légal aspects
of the state and/or rural development (Hoorweg 1981; van Binsbergen 1982).
Thus, the programme of the department of political science and history had
from its very inception stressed the importance of research in constitu-
tional law (van Binsbergen 1982: 15).
Griffiths's footnote 58 in the long passage quoted above (Griffiths
1983: 160), placed so as to suggest that it is going to reveal the name or
names of the current leadership of the African Studies Centre - allegedly
so insensitive to the study of African law - only mentions Holleman's
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y leadership up to 1969. Since 1980, the scientific leadership has been in
** the hands of Hoorweg and myself , as heads of the two research departments;
the library is managed by Van der Heulen; genera! management has for many
years been Grootenhuis's province; while a Board, and a Board of Trustees,
check long-term policy décisions. I am head of the department specifically
tuentioned by Griffiths. It is therefore reasonäble to conc lüde that his
devastating criticism is largely directed at me, as one entrusted with the
formulation and Implementation of the department 's research policy (2).
However, the real issue is not my person, scholarly performance, or
the discipline I was trained in, but revolves on the following questions:
- Is our department a good environment for African law research, in
: terms of both personnel and of explicltly stated research programmes and
| policies?
- If these conditions are essentially positive, what kind of African
law research should we have in such a department? Only if the answer to
this question would be: 'monodiscipliiiary law research', would it be a
liability to the department and to legal research therein if its head were
not a lawyer or legal anthropologist.
Our present department and its composition show that meaningful law
research can be undertaken outside a spécifie department of legal studies.
The members of our department include Buijtenhuis, Hesseling and Konings,
all of whom feature in Griffiths 's account as having done work in the
\
field of African law studies. Of these, only Hesseling is a lawyer, while
Buijtenhuijs and Konings have primarily published on revolutionary move-
ments and urban and rural class struggles within the f râmework of
twentiethcentury African states. Other members of the department are
Baesjou (whose interest in the history of litigation on the West African
coast has led to a collection of papers, Palaver , co-edited by him; cf.
Baesjou & Ross 1979); de Jong, whose Islamological studies pay considér-
able attention to Islamic law particularly in the context of Muslim mystic
associations; cf. de Jong 1978); February, whose work on language problems
and the position of the so-called Coloureds in South Africa strongly
emphasizes légal aspects (cf. February 1976, 1981, 1983); and finally
Schoenmakers, whose current research in Guinea-Bissau explicitly includes
a study of constitutional processes. Until early 1984, the department
included Van Leynseele, about half of whose Leiden doctorate, 1979, deals
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with the légal institutions of Libinza society, Zaïre - another omission
in Griffiths bibliography which however claims to be complete. In short, I
could hardly imagine, in the country, a research department where the
!
study of African law would find a more stimulâting and competent setting -
provided one accepts the view that African legal studies should not be
conducted in a monodisciplinary vacuüm but should form part of an!pverall
interdiseiplinary research commitment to the African continent and its
Problems.
Admittedly, the existence of such a setting would still only compen-
sate for the dissolution of the pre-existing African law section, if
within our department spécifie research projects are to be undertaken
focussing on African law. Griffiths suggests that this is not the case,
but he is wrong.
Now that the Senegal project on land law and state-imposed legal
change is nëaring completion, new law projects are being proposed within
the department of political science and history. The African Studies
Centre's commitment to the study of law in Africa remains as firm as ever.
While we agrée with Griffiths that African law research should be under-
taken by experienced professionals (lawyers, legal anthropologists, legal
sociologists), there is no reason why their research should be undertaken
on a monodisciplinary basis, i.e. in a separate law department or law
section. As is the case internationally in the field of African Studies,
disciplinary boundaries are fading at the African Studies Centre; our
record of recent publications, and list of research projects, may indicate
that this is a good thing. Of course, much of this interdisciplinary work
is not specifically on law in Africa; but why should an approach that has
proved to be productive in such related fields as sociology, anthropology,
political science, history and the science of literature, be such a bad
thing if applied to socio-légal studies as well?
At the same time it should be emphasized that African law studies are
by.no means to be confined to legal anthropology. Law in Africa today
exists not only, not even primarily, at the level of villages and of
chiefs' traditional courts. The interaction between historical judicial
forms on the one hand, and modern law as formulated by the state on the
other (a topic on which the research programme of our previous law section
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revolved) may be important, but again it is by no means the only topic
worthy of Africanist legal research. Thus if one concentrâtes on land
tenure and land reform, one soon learns that legal anthropologists (mainly
trained to work at the level of face-to-face social relations) are not
optimally equipped to study the intricate formal legal procedures African
bureaucracies generate and impose at the national and regional level. This
is why the exécution of our Senegal land reform project has been primarily
entrusted to an experienced constitutional lawyer (Hesseling), while the
work of the more junior anthropologist (Sypkens-Smit) was confined to the
village level. In our department of political science and history, where
research focusses on the economie and ideological dimensions of the state
in precolonial, colonial and postcolonial Africa, we may well contemplate
topics in the study of African law which Griffiths (1983: 163) would deern
'marginal' from a legal-anthropological point of view: national constitu-
tional processes, as both creating and reflecting power structures and
ideological tendencies in the society at large; the legal constraints
governing processes of information and participation, including forms of
political and religieus association (political parties, Islande pious
associations, Christian churches), the press and other media; legal
aspects of the organization of economie life, from Islamic banking corpo-
Jî rations such as have recently been established throughout West Africa, via
H a large variety of parastatal bodies, to labour législation, trade unions,
land reform and the legal-organizational structure of rural development
projects; the challenges which established constitutional structures are
facing from the part of revolutionary movements and libération movements
(e.g, Chad, South Africa); interstatal interactions in the way of trea-
ties, international bodies, armed conflict; and légal aspects of such
pressing national and international African problems as famine, refugees
etc.
If we agrée that thé study of law should form an intégral part of
African studies, we should strive towards thé sélection of research topics
that combine scientific and societal relevance to thé highest possible
degree (cf. van Binsbergen 1982: 7-11); we should also maintain and expand
relations of intellectual exchange within and across our national bounda-
ries. Regretfully, thé tone and content of Griffiths's review suggest that
in this process we can expect very little help from him and his associâ-
tes.
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NOTES
(1) I am indebted to several of my colleâgues for criticism of earlier
drafts; however, the responsibility for the views expressed here is
entirely mine.
(2) Seing only human, I cannot repress the temptation to produce here
summarily my (admittedly limited) credentials in the field of African
legal studies (cf. Griffiths 1983: 169; van Binsbergen 1977; 1981: 51f,
57f; Hesseling 1982: 2; Doornbos, Hesseling & van Binsbergen, in press). I
would readily agrée with Griffiths that this is not enough to qualify as a
légal anthropologist; but that is immaterial. One cannot expect the
leadership of a multidisciplinary research structure to be fully qualified
in all disciplines involved - the essential thing is the existence of
explicit policy that provides room and stimulus for these various dis-
ciplines.
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A COMMENT ON DR. VAN BINSBERGEN'S REMARKS
John Griffiths
It would certainly be distasteful to respond to dr. van Bins-
bergen's reaction to my review article on Dutch légal anthro-
pology (NNR 1983/2: 132) in thé tone which hè has chosen. I limit
myself to clarifying a few points:
1. I can claim neither thé crédit he bestows on an "outsider" nor
excuse myself with thé unfamiliarity with thé Dutch scène which
he suggests. In thé first place because such implicit nationalisai
is scientifically quite irrelevant: my review article was not
about Dutch académie life or politics, but about Dutch anthro-
pology of law. In thé second place, because I am in fact not an
outsider to thé Dutch university world nor to that of légal an-
thropology. And in thé third place because my article had the
benefit of advice and criticism from those best placed to judge
the current situation and best informed about its history; their
help is acknowledged in the footnote on the first page of the
article.
As indicated in the same first footnote, the version published in
NNR was a provisional one (NNR has long had a policy of pub-
lishing work-in-progress); readers were urged to call omissions
and errors to my attention. I am grateful to van Binsbergen for
having mentioned several items I had overlooked (Baesjou & Ross,
1979; Harrell-Bond e.a., 1978; Leynseele, 1979) and which pro-
bably require mention in a revised version of the article.
2. The subject of my review article was legal anthropology, not
what van Binsbergen calls "law research" or "legal studies". What
he says about the latter is therefore quite irrelevant. (Vague-
ness about such an elementary distinction is precisely one of the
reasons for concern about the future of anthropology of law at
the ASC.)
Although he is not entirely clear on this, van Binsbergen seems
to be of the opinion that the interaction between state and local
law is only one araong many equally eligible objects for Dutch
scholarship in African law. In this I believe him to be mistaken.
The circumstances and conséquences of legal pluralism are the
characteristic feature and give rise to the characteristic pro-
blems common to all African legal Systems. It is, for example, no
accident that when Leiden recently created a chair in African
constitutional law, the job-description made it clear that
pluralism and interaction in public law should be the central
concern of thé holder of thé chair. Furthermore, because of the
adat-law tradition, Dutch scholarship has much to offer in the
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study of legal pluralism and lts Implications; ou the other hand
one can wonder whether Dutch scholarship can significantly con-
tribute to the study of most other aspects of African law and why
a Dutch research institute would choose to emphasize them.
3. Van Binsbergen disagrees with my judgment concerning the rela-
tive importance of various Dutch scholars and their work. I tried
to make the reasons for my judgement clear in my review article.
He gives no reasons whatever for his contrary position, for bis
ex cathedra pronouncements that some writings have been "séminal"
and that others (unnamed) are "insigificant". I see no reason to
adjust my original judgment.
4. Thé opening passages of van Binsbergen's reaction, whatever
one may think of them, turn out to be gratuitous, sinee there is
really only one (relatively tiny) part of my review which in-
terests him, and that is my négative assessment of récent deve-
lopments concerning thé poèition of research in anthropology of
law (not, again, of "law studies") at the ASC. My assessment was
based on extensive discussions with a number of well-informed
persons, as well as a limited amount of personal exposure. So
far, I am aware of no reason for doubting its général accuracy.
It is this: The ASC began, under Holleman's leadership, an active
program in légal anthropological research and related activities,
which made the Center (largely because of thé efforts of van
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal) an exciting and important locus of work in
légal anthropology during thé 1970s. Internai reorganization,
involving thé incorporation of thé hitherto independent law sec-
tion into a department headed by van Binsbergen, and taken
without seeking the advice of those active in the field, threa-
tens thé independence and therefore thé future of this once-
flourishing institutional base for anthropology of law.
There are two sorts of reactions to this assessment which could
form the basis of an open exchange. Of course, I would be hap-
piest if van Binsbergen could convince me that my fears for the
future are unfounded. Or hè could say, "So much the worse for
anthropology of law—-we think other things are more important."
In the latter case I would probably disagree with him (depending
of course on the alternatives), but it would be an honest dis-
agreement. Instead of either of these reactions, he merely ob-
fuscates what is going on in a way which makes serious discussion
practically impossible. A few examples:
—work in legal anthropology is not "monodisciplinary" (see,
e.g., my discussion of Holleman's article, "Law and anthro-
pology," on page 185). It would in this connection be in-
teresting to know what expérience it is from which van Bins-
bergen says he quickly learned that legal anthropologists are
not "bptimally equipped" to study "the intricate formal legal
procedures African bureaucracies generate and impose at the
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national levai"; it would also be interesting to know what
expérience it is which led him to thé surprising conclusion
that a constitutional lawyer is so equipped.
—thé Sierra Leone project was not "rather more successful"
than I suggested; if anything, it was less so. It is wrong to
suggest that this project was the major activity of the ASC
in the 1970s, as far as légal anthropology is concerned. (My
judgment of the project and the reasons for it are to be
found on page 188.)
—the current research activities of van Binsbergen's
department do not afford much hope that research in légal
anthropology will continue to be nurtured. Few of the pub-
lications mentioned by him in this connection are relevant
(either because law is completely marginal or because they
are in no sensé anthropological). Apart from van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal, there is hardly any current activity at the ASC
which is of interest to thé international Community in legal
anthropology or capable of making a significant contribution
to problems of African law and légal development (what there
is, e.g. Konings 1983b, is not mentioned by van Binsbergen
but was dealt with in my review article). The Senegal pro-
ject, after a promissing beginning under van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal's guidance (a guidance backed by years of expérience
with land law and land reform in West Africa, both at the
field level and at the level of national législation), later
got absorbed into the Department of Political Science and
History, and appears in the year since my review to have
rather bogged down; despite the huge Investment, it has yet
to produce significant research results.
That van Binsbergen indiscriminately throws everything in which
the word "law" appears, regardless of approach and quality, onto
one pile, whose mère dimensions he invites the reader to admire,
only obscures the fact that there have been and are good people
at the ASC, some of whom have occasionally done interesting work
that can be reckoned to the anthropology of law. It does not,
however, address the question which led to my negative assessment
of the future of anthropology of law at the ASC, namely whether
the structural conditions for continuation of an interesting
research tradition in anthropology of law are being threatened.
He has not convinced my that my judgment of a year ago is unwar-
ranted. On thé contrary.
